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Consumer genetic testing has become immensely popular in recent years and
has lead to the creation of large scale genetic databases containing millions
of dense autosomal genotype profiles. One of the most used features offered
by genetic databases is the ability to find distant relatives using a technique
called relative matching (or DNA matching). Recently, novel uses of relative
matching were discovered that combined matching results with genealogical
information to solve criminal cold cases. New estimates suggest that relative
matching, combined with simple demographic information, could be used to
re-identify a significant percentage of US Caucasian individuals. In this work
we attempt to systematize computer security and privacy risks from relative
matching and describe new security problems that can occur if an attacker up-
loads manipulated or forged genetic profiles. For example, forged profiles can
be used by criminals to misdirect investigations, con-artists to defraud victims,
or political operatives to blackmail opponents. We discuss solutions to miti-
gate these threats, including existing proposals to use digital signatures, and
encourage the consumer genetics community to consider the broader security
implications of relative matching now that it is becoming so prominent.
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1
Introduction
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing services have become immensely popular in recent
years [23]. For under $100, DTC services will genotype customers using high-density autoso-
mal SNP microarrays that probe between 500,000-1,000,000 markers [2, 3, 19]. These genetic
profiles are analyzed to help customers better understand their ancestry and health, or for gen-
eral curiosity. DTC companies also allow customers to download their raw genetic profiles so
they can analyze the data themselves or upload profiles to third-party services that can aggregate
profiles from different DTC companies and offer advanced features. Many third-party service
providers were created for amateur or academic purposes, but recently, they have become quite
large, in some cases containing close to 1 million profiles [5]. We distinguish between DTC
companies, which produce genetic data directly from biological material, and third-party ser-
vices that only aggregate and analyze genetic data produced from other sources.
One of the most popular features offered by both DTC and third-party services is long range
familial relative matching (or DNA matching). With high-density genotype data it is possible
to accurately identify distant relatives, including relatives as distant as 3rd cousins or further,
in large databases that include millions of profiles [17]. Relative matching algorithms work by
finding large DNA segments that are shared between individuals, known as identical by descent
(IBD) segments, that are indicative of shared ancestry because they have been inherited from a
recent common ancestor without intervening recombination. The total quantity and distribution
IBD segments between two individuals is then used to predict their familial relationship [16].
Analysis with MyAncestry data showed that matching relatives are quite common, with over
44% of profiles returning a third cousin and 10% with a second cousin or closer [12]. We can
expect that the probability of a match will only increase as these databases grow larger.
Relative matches can be profound and sometimes life changing because of the cultural and
legal significance of family relationships. For example, matches routinely reunite adopted chil-
dren with their birth parents and identify cases of unexpected paternity [7, 25, 11]. However,
it was the high profile use of relative matching by law enforcement to identify the suspected
Golden State Killer that has perhaps drawn the most attention. To solve this case, law enforce-
ment used DNA samples obtained from old crime scenes to construct a valid DTC genetic pro-
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file; this profile was uploaded to GEDMatch, a third-party genetic ancestry service that supports
relative matching [18, 14]. Investigators identified third cousins of the suspect, which enabled
them to narrow their search to the suspected killer [18]. Since the Golden State Killer case,
genetic genealogy approaches have been used over a dozen times to solve other cold cases and
identify deceased individuals [4, 10]. Business like Parabon Nanolabs labs now offer genetic
genealogy services to law enforcement to help them solve cases using this technique [24].
Relative matching in consumer genetic databases significantly enhances the capabilities of
law enforcement to match distant relatives when compared to government maintained forensic
databases, like the FBI maintained CODIS database. CODIS primarily maintains alleles for a
small number of 13-20 core, short tandem repeat (STR) markers [6, 13]. Relative searching
with STR markers relies on comparing markers directly, which limits the CODIS database
to finding closely related family members [15]. Consumer databases also contain a number
of other advantages over government forensic databases. They contain profiles from a more
diverse population because they include data from the general public, not just suspected or
convicted criminals, and relative matching in consumer databases avoids regulations that restrict
or preclude relative matching in government databases [22, 21]. Therefore, it is no surprise to
see law enforcement rapidly adopt relative matching techniques on consumer databases to solve
crimes.
The growing prominence of DTC and third-party consumer genetic databases in important
applications, like criminal investigations, raises significant computer security (a.k.a., cyber se-
curity) concerns. In effect, third-party genetic databases designed for amateur ancestry analysis
are now used as criminal forensic databases—except there do not appear to be the same rigor-
ous computer security standards that exist in government maintained forensic databases. Most
concerning is that other individuals can leverage the same genetic genealogy techniques as law
enforcement: malicious actors can re-identify individuals, spoof profile metadata (e.g., identity
of the profile), or even make entirely fake profiles by directly manipulating the digital genotype
data. As these databases continue to be used beyond their original intended purpose, criminals
or other malicious actors may be motivated to compromise or manipulate databases that support
relative matching. In this work we describe potential risks associated with relative matching in
consumer genomic databases and discuss what services can do to enhance their safety.
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Next steps. We argue that given the high profile use of these databases, now is the time to have
an industry-wide conversation about the computer security risks relevant to DTC and third-party
consumer genetic databases. Since the issues we raise have the potential to be industry-wide,
and since many of the observations we make are natural extensions of prior observations (but
with a computer security perspective), we would consider it improper to disclose our findings to
only the companies and actors in this field that we can enumerate—doing so would only give
them and not others the ability to proactively consider mitigations. By disclosing our findings of
potential risks in this work, as well as a further discussion of defenses, we hope to catalyze the
incorporation of strong defenses in all DTC and third-party consumer databases, and we hope
to engender the appropriate level of caution by all parties (such as those from law enforcement)
who might seek to use present-day DTC and third-party consumer databases in their activities.
Adversarial Goals
Support for unrestricted relative matching exposes consumer genetic databases to additional
computer security and privacy related risks than what might be anticipated. Other issues, like
data theft or discriminatory use of genetic data, are certainly a concern, but in this work we
emphasis how relative matching, in particular, creates new problems. Consider the wide range
of malicious actors, with varying capabilities, that have motivation to take advantage of relative
matching services. This includes criminals with unidentified forensic DNA evidence that want
to remain anonymous, con-artists that could use fabricated relatedness to gain the trust of their
victims, or even sophisticated political or intelligence actors that want to blackmail or harm the
reputation of their opponents (see Table 1 for an extended list of actors and their goals). We
categorize the goals of adversaries into three groups:
1. Avoid identification. The goal is to remain anonymous or difficult to detect with relative
matching queries. This is precisely the situation where a criminal perpetrated a crime
and left physical DNA evidence, like the Golden State Killer, and is trying to avoid de-
tection by law enforcement using ancestry analysis. This is also useful for individuals,
like known fugitives, that have assumed a false identity to remain undetected— in fact,
just recently, relative matching on GEDMatch was used to identify an individual that had
assumed the identity of a deceased 8-year old boy for over 20 years [26].
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Malicious Actor Motivations
Perpetrator of Unsolved Crime or Fugitive
Avoid Identification
Receive Advanced Warning of Pending Discovery
Confidence Trickster Defraud Target
Paparazzi or Stalker Reveal Target’s Ancestry
Unwilling Parent
Avoid Paternity Obligations
Imply False Paternity on a Target
Avoid Discovery of Infidelity
Genetic Surveillance Link Unknown Genetic Profile to Identity
Curious Individual Re-Identify Anonymous Public Research Profiles
Political Operative
Damage Opponent’s Reputation
Blackmail
Intelligence Agency
Identify Foreign Operatives
Blackmail
Table 1: Possible malicious actors and their motivations to attack genetic databases that support
relative matching.
2. Determine a target’s identity and relatives. It has already been shown that relative
matching can be used to re-identify a large number of US individuals, and just as law
enforcement has used relative matching to identify unknown individuals, malicious actors
could do the same [12]. Such re-identification could threaten the privacy of anonymized
research subjects or endanger foreign operatives and undercover agents that have assumed
a false identity for legitimate purposes. Matching results could also be used to uncover
sensitive details, like hidden children. For example, if a high profile individual, like a
politician or celebrity, had an unknown or hidden child then an attacker could use this
knowledge to discredit or blackmail that individual.
3. Remove or forge new relatives. Criminals could remove or use forged relationships for
a number of purposes: con-artists could forge relations with a target to gain their trust,
perpetrators could put blame on others by forging profile data, and parents could use
falsified profiles to misattribute paternity to another person.
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Threat Vectors
The open nature of consumer genomics, especially third-party services, gives attackers many
ways to manipulate relative searches. Below we describe different methods that a malicious
actor can use to achieve different objectives: unauthorized use of DNA data or profiles, meta-
data spoofing, synthetic relatives, denial-of-service, and directly deleting or modifying existing
genetic profiles (Table 2; Figure 1).
Unauthorized Use of DNA Profiles. This is when someone fraudulently gathers or uses a
target’s genetic profile in a relative matching query without authorization. This would be useful
to anyone wanting to determine an individual’s identity or familial relationships. To use a
target’s genetic profile in a relative matching query, the attacker needs either access to the digital
genotype data or be able to collect a DNA sample from the target to generate the profile. In
some cases, the attacker will already have access to the digital profile of a target. For example,
there are many public research datasets that contain high-density SNP microarray or whole
genome sequencing data for many anonymous research subjects [1]. This data could easily be
converted into compliant DTC genetic profiles that could be uploaded to third-party databases.
Moving forward, data breaches may be another source of genetic profiles. There have already
been security issues at genetic testing companies. For example, in June 2018 it was discovered
that over 92 million user passwords and email addresses from a major DTC company were
leaked [20].
When the attacker does not have the target’s genetic profile data but has physical access to
them, a competent attacker can collect a physical sample from the target to construct a genetic
profile. Currently, major DTC companies require saliva or buccal samples to generate profiles,
which may be difficult to obtain from a target. However, there are already examples of ama-
teurs collecting and processing DNA from heterogeneous samples. In 2013, the artist Heather
Dewey-Hagborg, in her project Stranger Visions, collected random DNA around New York City
from sources like cigarette butts and gum and analyzed this DNA to generate face portraits using
forensic DNA phenotyping algorithms [8]. In a similar fashion, an attacker could use DIY-bio
spaces, available in many cities, to extract DNA and sequence it using a third-party sequencing
provider. Heather Dewey-Hagborg also demonstrated that it is easy to obtain anonymous saliva
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Attack Objective Expertise
Unauthorized Use of DNA Profiles
Uncover Identity of Target
Low
Determine Target’s Relatives
Spoof Metadata
Hide Identity from Relative Searches
Low
Implicate Wrong Individual
Synthetic Relatives
Misdirect Relative Searches
Medium
Create False Relatives of a Target
Denial-of-Service Thwart Relative Matching Medium
Compromised or Privileged Access
Add, Delete, or Modify Relative Matches
High
Corrupt Audit Log
Table 2: Possible attacks against genetic databases with relative matching, the objective of these
attacks, and necessary expertise required to execute a given attack.
samples when she ordered some over the Internet using only an academic email and mailing
address and then sent the saliva to a DTC company for processing [9]. Some actors, like nation
states, could generate profiles from DNA samples directly using their own facilities.
Spoof Metadata. One of the simplest things a malicious actor can do is to falsify metadata—
the information associated with the genetic profiles like name or email address—when a DNA
sample or raw profile data is sent to a DTC or third-party service. In some cases, this metadata
is the only information linking the genetic profile to a particular individual.
This is clearly useful to someone trying to avoid identification. For example, a criminal
could upload their own profile data, which they could easily obtain from a DTC service, under
a false identity. This could confuse or slow down an investigation because the criminal’s profile
would appear to be another individual. It is likely that in criminal investigations any suspects
would be re-tested by law enforcement, which would reveal that the metadata was falsified.
However, the criminal could make this more difficult by spoofing the identity of an individual
that is difficult to reach, like someone that is deceased, living in another country, or is entirely
fictitious. If the criminal uploaded the data of another individual under their own identity they
might avoid suspicion in cases where law enforcement had more direct access to a genetic
database to run queries.
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3rd Party Database
Raw Prole Data
SNP1: A T 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: C A
SNP4: T T
   ...
John Doe
SNP1: A A 
SNP2: G T
SNP3: C C
SNP4: A T
   ...
Kim Hill
Amy Ross
SNP1: C C 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: G T
SNP4: T T
   ...
John Doe
SNP1: A T 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: C A
SNP4: T T
   ...
John Doe
SNP1: A T 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: C A
SNP4: T T
   ...
Kim Hill
SNP1: A T 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: C A
SNP4: T T
   ...
Amy Ross
SNP1: A T 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: C A
SNP4: T T
   ...
Roy Gray
Spoof Metadata
Synthetic Relatives Denial-of-Service
Relative Matches
Compromised or 
Privileged Access
Construct Compliant Pro le 
Data from other DNA sources
Unauthorized Use
SNP1: C C 
SNP2: G G
SNP3: G T
SNP4: T T
   ...
John Doe
A T
C A
Proles from Public Datasets 
or Data Breaches 
DNA from
Attacker/Target
DTC Company
Mail Sample to Direct-to-
Consumer Testing Service
Figure 1: Overview of threats to 3rd-party genetic databases that support relative matching.
DNA profiles can be obtained in a number of ways, including through standard DTC genetic
testing, by indirectly generating them from other DNA sources, or from publicly available data.
An attacker can take advantage of relative matching by uploading manipulated profile data, or
if they have direct access, by manipulating the database itself.
Synthetic Relationships. The raw genotype data itself, including SNPs, can also be modi-
fied. This is a problem because some third-party services do not confirm that uploaded profile
data was produced by a reputable DTC service and left unmodified. IBD segment sharing has
been simulated in prior work to evaluate IBD detection algorithms, and we believe that simi-
lar techniques can be used to generate forged profiles that are designed to look like relatives a
given individual, which we call synthetic relatives [16, 17]. If synthetic relative profiles were
then uploaded to third-party services, those profiles could trick relative matching algorithms
into making spurious relative matches.
The ability to create false relatives can lead to a number of security problems. Consider
the case of a perpetrator that is trying to avoid identification. The simplest case is when the
perpetrator has no identifiable relatives in a third-party database; they could upload a distant
synthetic relative under a false identity to misdirect a genetic genealogy investigation. This
may also give the perpetrator advanced notice of a pending investigation because the person
falsely associated with the synthetic relative may be contacted for questioning about their family
history and may have an existing relationship with the perpetrator.
A more challenging scenario is when the perpetrator already has distant relative profiles in
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third-party databases (which the perpetrator could identify using their own profile or a partially
falsified one). In this case, the perpetrator could upload synthetic relatives, but with the identity
of someone on a distant branch of the family tree that is not related to the perpetrator but is re-
lated to a real relative already in the database (see Figure 2a for a visual example). Whether this
works in general will depend on how many matching relatives already exist in the database, the
overall topology of the family tree, and the existence of other sources of corroborating informa-
tion, like known family trees. Distant synthetic relatives can also be used to falsely implicate a
particular target. For example, in some situations, two matching relatives on different branches
of a family tree can narrow a search to a small number of individuals (Figure 2b). Any falsified,
synthetic relatives would be discovered if the identity associated with them was ever closely in-
vestigated and re-tested. However, since synthetic matches are designed to appear like relatives
of the perpetrator and not the perpetrator themselves, it is possible that the synthetic relatives
would not be scrutinized.
It is not just perpetrators but other types of actors that could use synthetic relatives mali-
ciously. For example, a con-artist could upload a synthetic profile designed to look like the
child of a target, using the con-artist’s name, to falsify a parent-child relationship. Politically
motivated actors could also use synthetic children to imply a child born out of wedlock to tar-
nish their opponent’s reputation. In these cases, the relationship might seem serendipitous and
not be re-tested (or not be re-tested until after significant damage has been done).
We propose a simple approach to generate synthetic relatives by splicing SNPs from mul-
tiple profiles together. To begin, the attacker starts with the genetic profile of the target that
will be related to the synthetic relative. Then using another profile as a base— say from a pub-
lic database or an entirely synthetic profile— the attacker stitches in segments from the target
profile into the base profile based on the length and number of IBD segments that would be ex-
pected from the desired relationship (e.g., parent, 2nd cousin, etc.). The segment regions could
be randomly selected or copied from real relative matches with the desired relationship (which
are commonly published on amateur ancestry blogs).
Segments could be spliced from the target profile into the base profile by naively copying
over both alleles in each segment region. However, this would make the matching segments
appear to be full-IBD (i.e., matching on both chromosomes), which would only be expected
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SuspectSiblingSibling
ParentParent
G-ParentG-Parent
Great-GPGreat-GP
Great-A/UGreat-A/U
1C 1R
2nd Cousin2nd Cousin Synthetic
2nd Cousin
Synthetic
Cousin
Synthetic
2nd Cousin
Flasely Predicted 
Parents of Suspect
Average Relatedness 
of Prole to Suspect
Prole in Database
a b
Falsely Predicted 
Great-A/U of Suspect
Search occurs in 
the wrong directly
Figure 2: Examples of attacks using synthetic relatives. a, A criminal suspect wants to avoid
identification when their 2nd cousin is already in a database. The suspect uploads a synthetic
second cousin using the identity of an individual related to the 2nd cousin but not the suspect.
This makes it appear that the suspect is on the wrong branch of the family tree. b, The suspect
uploads two synthetic relatives, on different family branches, to falsely implicate a couple as
parents of the suspect.
for close relatives, like siblings. To construct half-IBD segments, only SNPs from one phase
should be spliced into the base profile (Figure 3). This technique could be extended to make a
synthetic profile related to many individuals by splicing additional target profiles together in a
similar manner. It is important to note that the synthetic relative will appear related to the base
profile as well, which might cause undesirable matches if a real genetic profiles was used as the
base profile. To summarize, synthetic relative construction could work as follows:
1. Determine the segment regions to copy from a an existing relative pair.
2. Phase the genotypes of the target and base profiles.
3. For each segment region, copy over the SNPs from one phase of the target profile and
replace those SNPs in one phase of the base profile.
4. Unphase the new modified base profile by randomly shuffling the SNPs. This modified
base profile is the final synthetic relative profile.
Denial-of-Service. There is no limit on the number of accounts and profiles that an attacker
can create and upload if account information is not verified. This can be useful to an attacker that
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Figure 3: Proposed method to generate synthetic relatives.
is trying to hide their identity because they can upload synthetic relatives under many different
accounts. This will cause an excessive number of relative matches that could overwhelm any
real matches with fake ones. However, this technique might arouse suspicious because the
number of matches could appear unrealistic. Another approach is to spoof a person with a large
family or who is a descendent of someone with a large number of children, like a sperm donor.
This could make it more difficult to narrow down the search to a manageable list of suspects
because the extended family would be very large.
Compromised or Privileged Database Access. The most powerful technique to manipulate
relative matches is when an attacker has compromised or privileged access to a genetic database.
With privileged access, an attacker is able to add, remove, or modify any profile in the database
to alter relative matches or modify logs used for auditing. This threat is particularly acute
when services have poor security practices. Here we note that experience in the computer
security community suggests that non-commercial services, especially those run by a small
number of people, can often have poor security practices; further, industries that have not yet
received adversarial pressure often do not implement state-of-the-art security best practices.
This threat is also relevant to actors, like governments, that are technically capable or to insiders
that already have high levels of access.
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Discussion
Long range familial matching is not new, but it was not until the recent explosion of high-
density consumer genetic testing that it became so effective and consequential. The ability to
match distant genetic relatives at a population scale is profound and brings a new set of computer
security challenges. The recent appropriation of amateur ancestry databases as an investigative
tool for law enforcement significantly raises the stakes.
In this work we described a wide range of actors with varying capabilities that have interest
in modifying or corrupting relative matching queries, which makes the threat space especially
complex. There are a number ways to minimize the risk of relative matching attacks. A major
issue is that some third-party services do not confirm that all profiles originate from legitimate
DTC services. A failure to authenticate profiles may allow attackers to upload digitally con-
structed or altered DTC genetic profile data files. This attack vector can be eliminated if all
raw profiles are known to be generated by a reputable DTC testing service. This can be accom-
plished if the raw data files are digitally signed using a cryptographic key controlled by the DTC
company, as was recently suggested by Erlich et. al., or by exchanging data using APIs instead
of letting users directly upload their raw genetic profiles [12]. However, we suggest going a
step further by having the genotyping instrument itself sign and attest to the data it generates,
including instrument id, date, and time of data generation. As a side-effect, digitally signed ge-
netic profiles will prevent law enforcement from uploading raw profiles in cases where profiles
cannot be generated directly from a DTC service and will instead require law enforcement to
work with DTC companies directly.
Digital signatures will ensure that the genotype data was created by a DTC testing service,
but will not confirm that metadata associated with a profile is legitimate. To do this DTC and
third-party companies should confirm the identity of their customers. It is a common practice
for people to upload profiles on behalf of their relatives, so it may not be possible to verify
the identity of specific profiles that are generated; however, at a minimum, the identity of the
account owner should be verified. Identity verification also minimizes the risk of denial-of-
service attacks because it naturally limits the number of account that can be created. Account
identity could also be further tied to the profile data via digital signatures.
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Finally, we have concerns about the general computer security practices of consumer genetic
databases, especially third-party services that have not previously faced significant adversarial
pressure. Given the sensitivity, size, and way third-party services are being used, we argue that
it is important that they adopt software security best practices. This can include instituting better
user authentication procedures, routine auditing and penetration testing, and frequent software
updates, among others.
In the future, the efficacy of different relative matching attacks will depend largely on the
population coverage in these database and the presence of other sources of information like
family histories. The more dense these databases, the more difficult it will be to avoid identi-
fication. However, other attacks, like re-identification, will become correspondingly easier. In
any case, whenever relative matches are used in important applications (e.g., criminal investi-
gation, paternity, etc.) all results should be corroborated with additional testing.
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